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  1. Personal Injury Lawyer
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Susan B.

Personal Injury Lawyer

Any person can file a complaint about such statements with a state commission that, in turn, must refer the matter to a county prosecutor if the commission determines by clear and convincing evidence that the false-statement law was violated. At least in the context of a pre-enforcement challenge, the Court in Susan B. In Spokeo, Inc. Robins , 73 the Supreme Court considered the concrete and particularized injury prong of the injury-in-fact test in a case claiming that inaccuracies in the results of a "people search engine" inquiry constituted a violation of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The Court made very clear that "concrete" and "particularized" are two separate and distinct requirements. A particularized injury "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. A concrete injury must be "real" and not "abstract. Intangible injuries may, according to the Spokeo Court, be concrete. While Congress may identify intangible harms it seeks to redress by statute, the fact that Congress creates a statutory right and causes of action to enforce that right does not, alone, mean that the injury-in-fact requirement is met.

A "bare procedural violation" is not necessarily enough because it may not cause real harm to the plaintiff. One of the goals of public law litigation is to force the government to comply with the Constitution and federal statutes. In a largely unbroken line of cases, the Supreme Court has refused to permit litigation of these so-called citizen or taxpayer suits. In United States v. The Court expounded on these principles in Warth v.

The Court explained in Warth that the prohibition against citizen standing and taxpayer standing did not derive from Article III. Because the requirement is prudential, Congress can dispense with it. Allen v. Wright culminated the demise of both citizen standing and taxpayer standing. Plaintiffs did not allege that their children wished to attend these private schools. Rather, the parents alleged that governmental financial assistance to discriminatory schools both harmed them and impaired their ability to have the public schools desegregated.

The Supreme Court returned to the topic of generalized grievances in Hollingsworth v. Perry , the case challenging California's Proposition 8 banning gay marriage on due process and equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court held that they lacked standing to do so because they had no direct stake in the outcome of the case.

Once the initiative passed, the Court reasoned, the proponents had the same generalized interest in its legality as any other citizen of California. Nonetheless, the Court has sometimes found standing based upon claims of injury that can be described only as generalized or abstract. In Federal Election Commission v. The Court found that plaintiff voters had standing because the voters were not afforded access to information that might assist them in casting their vote, even though all voters could have claimed the same thing.

That would put Akins closer to Trafficante than Defenders of Wildlife , discussed above. In cases in which the government acts against the plaintiff, causation is simple. The Supreme Court has found standing in some cases notwithstanding an attenuated or uncertain chain of causation. The Court first articulated the requirements of causation and redressability in Linda R.

Richard D. The Court held that the mother lacked standing because she did not show that enforcement or threat of enforcement of the statute would cause the father to make child support payments. In Warth , low-income plaintiffs who wished to reside in Penfield, New York, challenged zoning restrictions that effectively precluded the construction of low and moderate-income housing within the city.

Both were regarded as too speculative. Because the plaintiffs failed to establish that city zoning practices caused their injury, they were not allowed to challenge those practices. By contrast, the Court later held in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation that a developer of low-income housing and one of its putative tenants had standing to challenge exclusionary zoning practices.

Plaintiffs in Arlington Heights overcame standing problems by paying attention to detail. Rather than mount an abstract challenge to exclusionary zoning practices on behalf of developers who hoped to develop at some future time and tenants who hoped to rent somewhere, they identified a developer and an individual with specific injuries more closely traceable to city action.

Because they pled a commitment to act if relief were granted, these plaintiffs also established a greater likelihood of redressability. By recognizing from the outset the importance of establishing that exclusionary zoning caused the inability to develop or to rent, they overcame the Warth obstacle.

  1. 3.1 Standing.
  2. North Carolina Constitution - Article 1 - North Carolina General Assembly.
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Arlington Heights represents a wise response to Warth : to identify with precision the injury and to demonstrate the link between the injury and official action. Simon v. Plaintiffs pled that each of the hospitals was tax-exempt and received substantial private contributions. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the denial of treatment was fairly traceable to the revised revenue ruling. Causation is much easier to show when it turns on the plaintiffs' own actions or decisions not to act. Friends of the Earth is a good example.

The Court did not require the plaintiffs to demonstrate that particular discharges into a river had caused them injury or increased their risk of injury. Environmental Protection Agency involved a somewhat different concept of causation. The Court held that causation is present even if there is a tentative or incremental link between the challenged action or inaction and asserted injury. In a sense, causation was clear and certain in Massachusetts ; the issue was, instead, the extent to which the link must be quantitatively significant.

In the great majority of cases the inquiry into causation and redressability are indistinguishable. Thus, in Warth the Court held that there was no reason to suppose that the elimination of exclusionary zoning would enable the plaintiffs to obtain housing in Penfield. Furthermore, in Allen , the Court held it was entirely speculative that revoking tax-exempt status for allegedly discriminatory private schools would serve to foster public school integration.

While the scope of equitable relief to redress unlawful governmental action has long been a matter of controversy, not until City of Los Angeles v.

Statutes & Constitution :View Statutes : Online Sunshine

Lyons did the Court clearly articulate the requirement of remedial efficacy as a constitutional component of standing. He alleged that the city permitted the police department to use unnecessary choke holds indiscriminately. The Court conceded that Lyons had standing to sue for damages. An injunction would not redress his injury because it was unlikely that he would be arrested and choked again. Thus, the requirement of remedial efficacy grew out of the focus upon causation; whenever causation was in doubt, so too was remedial efficacy. The notion of uncertainty in redressability arose in a different context in Defenders of Wildlife.

The Court found that plaintiffs had not demonstrated redressability because the funding agencies were not otherwise bound by any consultation requirement and because the funding agencies supplied only a small percentage of the financing for certain projects. The ability of prospective injunctive relief to remedy past wrongs dealt with in Lyons has echoes in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment. The Environmental Protection Agency alerted the firm that it had failed to file the forms for several years.

The firm then did so. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief and civil penalties.

The Court found that the plaintiff failed the redressability prong of the standing test. The Court held that such relief would not redress the injury previously caused when the firm failed to file the forms. The plaintiff did not allege that such a violation was going to happen again, and, without it, there was no basis for prospective injunctive relief. Environmental Protection Agency was somewhat more forgiving. Holding that the redressability prong can be satisfied even if relief only promises modest reductions in remote risk, the Court held that:. The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real.

That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. The clear message of Lyons and Steel Company is to choose plaintiffs with care and, whenever possible, to choose plaintiffs who have suffered recurrent application of the practice or policy at issue.

In preparing a claim seeking injunctive relief based upon past conduct, the attorney must therefore articulate in the complaint the reasons why the risk of recurrence is more than speculative. When the acts or omissions promise to continue into the future, the less demanding perspective of Massachusetts offers potentially valuable support for creative redressability arguments. Reconciling these standing cases is not realistically possible. When, however, the action does not arise from such statutes and there is no explicit legislative mandate for intervention, the Court takes a much narrower view of standing.

Groups may have standing in a representative capacity, in an individual capacity, or in both. A group has standing in a representative capacity when it represents the rights of its members. Such standing is an exception to the general prohibition on third-party standing. An association has standing in an individual capacity or qua group when it asserts its own rights as an organization. The leading case articulating the standing requirements for groups that sue in a representative capacity is Hunt v.

Washington Apple Advertising Commission. Thus we have recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when:.

Injury Claims Against the Government in Kentucky

The second prong is also constitutionally based and is designed to ensure that the association has both a concrete stake in the outcome of the litigation and will approach it with adversarial vigor. With respect to the first element, when an organization asserts standing in a representative capacity, Hunt does not require the organization to allege that it has suffered any injury. Rather, the organization must establish that those whom it represents have suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing.

Injury to a single member will do. An issue commonly litigated relating to the first prong is whether the plaintiff is the sort of association entitled to avail itself of associational standing. Voluntary membership organizations, such as trade organizations, plainly qualify. Second, Hunt also requires some community of interest between the group and the injured member.

Third, Hunt permits representative standing only when neither the claim nor the relief sought require the participation of an injured individual. This element is typically satisfied when the plaintiff association seeks injunctive or declaratory relief generally benefiting the association and its members, even when there is a need for some limited participation of association members in fact discovery or at trial.

Given that a group asserting representative standing will fare no better than its individual members in establishing the requisite injury, one can fairly ask why associational standing is worth pursuing. The principal advantage of group standing lies in its use to obtain the benefits of a class action without the bother of class certification. Those benefits include the opportunity to obtain a judgment in favor of everyone adversely affected and to avoid mootness. Including a representative organization as a plaintiff may justify broader relief than would otherwise be available in a single plaintiff action.

It also may avoid mootness of questions tied to the passing stake in the controversy of individual members. Representative claims thereby effectively shift the case and controversy focus from whether a particular individual has a live claim to whether any group member has a live claim. In this sense, representative standing resembles a class action without the problems posed by the requirement of class certification.

Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the propriety of representative group standing as an appropriate alternative to class action litigation for injunctive relief in International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers. Rejecting that argument, the Court reaffirmed Hunt. Representative group standing also may enable an individual member who does not wish to appear as a named plaintiff, or does not have the resources to do so, to avoid direct participation in the lawsuit.

For a variety of reasons, some individuals are reluctant to sue in their own name. However, their membership in a group can confer representative standing on the group. On the other hand, damages are not available in cases involving associational standing. An organization may also see representative group standing as a device to strengthen the organization within a community.

While these considerations may appear irrelevant to the development of a successful lawsuit, they may matter greatly to a fledgling organization. An organization that suffers injury in its own right—rather than, or in addition to, an injury to the rights of its members—has individual standing as a group. Only in limited circumstances, absent economic harm or diminution in membership, do courts uphold the assertion of standing for groups that suffer an injury to their organizational goals.

In structuring a claim by a group suing qua group, every effort should be made to identify and plead some kind of economic harm, frustration of a core interest, or membership loss flowing from the challenged conduct.

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Because combining individual group standing with associational group standing increases the likelihood of success in establishing standing, a group asserting injury to its own interests should, whenever possible, also plead representative standing. As a matter of judicial self-governance, the Court has also held that prudential considerations counsel against standing even in cases in which the Article III case or controversy requirement has been satisfied.

In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute , the Court suggested a liberal standard for applying the zone-of-interests test. The Court has more recently continued to adhere to a relaxed interpretation of the zone-of-interests test. Patchuk , the Court found that a neighboring property owner, concerned about the use of land purchased by the government for a tribe which intended it for gaming purposes, fell within the zone of interests of the statute authorizing the purchase because the eventual use of the land is to be considered in making the purchase.

First National Bank and Trust Company , the Court allowed a competing bank to challenge an order which was issued by the National Credit Union Administration and enlarged the charter of a credit union.

Nonetheless, the Court has applied the test to deny standing. In Air Courier Conference v. Third-party standing issues arise when a party seeks relief by asserting the rights of third parties not before the court. Look for similar items by category:. An Injury Law Constitution. Prices and offers may vary in store. An Injury Law Constitution presents a novel thesis that embraces leading features of the American law of injuries.

The book argues that the body of law that Americans have developed concerning responsibility for injuries and prevention of injuries has some of the qualities of a constitution - a fundamental set of principles that govern relations between human persons and between individual persons and corporate and governmental institutions. This ''injury law constitution'' includes tort law, legislative compensation systems like workers compensation, and the many statutes that regulate safety of activities and products including drugs, medical devices, automobile design, and pesticides.

Professor Shapo''s analysis, into which he weaves the history of these systems of law, is then linked to the unique compensation plan devised for the victims of the September 11th attacks. Professor Shapo writes about how our injury law reflects deeply held views in American society on risk and injury, indicating how the injury law constitution is a guide to the question of what it means to be an American. Setting aside easy academic formulas, An Injury Law Constitution captures the reality of how people respond to injury risks in functional contexts involving diverse activities and products.

About The Author. Marshall S.

Atlanta Injury Attorney

Shapo is Frederic P. Professor Shapo teaches courses and seminars in torts, the law of dangerous products, and science and the legal system. Select Parent Grandparent Teacher Kid at heart. Age of the child I gave this to:. Hours of Play:. Tell Us Where You Are:. Preview Your Review.